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SUSPENDED SENTENCES AND FREE-
STANDING PROBATION ORDERS IN U.S. 
GUIDELINES SYSTEMS: 
A SURVEY AND ASSESSMENT 
RICHARD S. FRASE* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Sentences to probation and other community-based sentences require backup 
sanctions to encourage compliance with the conditions of probation and respond 
to violations of those conditions. The most severe backup sanction in felony cases 
in the United States is revocation of release and commitment to prison. But such 
revocations have been a major contributor to mass incarceration;1 moreover, 
such revocations can result in offenders whose crimes do not justify a prison 
sentence being sent to prison—the problem of “net-widening.”2 
Legal systems have taken a variety of approaches in structuring backup 
sanctions for probation violations, particularly custodial sanctions. This article 
surveys and critiques two kinds of suspended prison sentences frequently used as 
backup sanctions in U.S. state and federal guidelines systems, and a third option 
that employs more limited custodial backup sanctions. 
When a court employs the first type of suspended sentence—a suspended-
execution prison sentence (SEPS)—it first imposes a specified prison term and 
then suspends some or all of that term and places the offender on probation with 
specified conditions. If the offender violates those conditions, the court has the 
option of executing the suspended prison term, usually with minimal hearing or 
other procedural requirements. In some systems, the court may also choose to 
execute only part of the suspended prison term. 
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 1.  See, e.g., Cecelia Klingele, Rethinking the Use of Community Supervision, 103 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1015, 1019–21 (2013). 
 2.  See Michelle S. Phelps, The Paradox of Probation: Community Supervision in the Age of Mass 
Incarceration, 35 LAW & POL’Y 51, 52 (2013). A broader definition of net widening than the one 
suggested in text would include not just offenders diverted into prison via suspended sentence followed 
by revocation but also cases where a suspended sentence replaces, without revocation, a less onerous non-
prison disposition such as a fine. See, e.g., Oren Gazal-Ayal & Nevine Emmanuel, Suspended Failure of 
Alternatives to Imprisonment, 82 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. no. 1, 2019 at 111. However, net-widening of 
the latter type is not a bad thing if the new intermediate option fills a need for a sanction in between 
fining and custody, provided that few such offenders end up in prison due to breach and revocation. 
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By contrast, the second type of suspended sentence—suspended imposition 
of sentence (SIS)—involves a form of deferred sentencing: the court places the 
offender on probation without making any decision about what specific prison 
term should be imposed for the crime or crimes for which the offender has just 
been convicted. In the event that the conditions of probation are violated, the 
court holds a formal sentencing hearing, with all of the procedural requirements 
of such a hearing, and may then impose any sentence that could have been 
imposed when the SIS was first pronounced. 
Under the third option noted above, local jail terms are used to sanction 
probation violations. This takes two forms. In the first, although probation is 
combined with a suspended-execution or suspended-imposition sentence that 
could be revoked, courts are encouraged to use jail terms to sanction probation 
violations. In the second, probation is imposed as a free-standing sentence with 
only non-prison custodial backup sanctions, rather than as a condition of a SEPS 
or SIS sentence. Under this approach the option of commitment to prison is off 
the table once the court places the offender on probation.3 
Each of the options above has advantages and disadvantages, which will be 
explored in Part III of this article. Part II provides a survey of the varying ways 
in which one or more of the options has been used in the nineteen U.S. guidelines 
systems that are currently in operation. 
Given the wide variety of issues addressed in this symposium, from legal 
systems in many countries, it is important to clarify the limited scope of this 
article. First, the article assumes a U.S. perspective and focuses on suspended or 
deferred prison sentences, not the shorter custodial terms that would usually be 
served in a local—city- or county-run—jail or workhouse.4 It focuses on prison 
sentences because they raise the most salient and important custody-sentence 
issue in the U.S. context. Reflecting the greater severity of U.S. sentencing 
compared to other developed countries, and perhaps the more frequent use of 
pretrial detention, there does not seem to be widespread concern about the 
overuse of jail sentences in the United States—although there should be. 
 
 3.  As reported in the other articles in this issue, one or both of the suspended-sentence options 
described in text appear to be widely used in jurisdictions outside of the United States, including all of 
the Scandinavian countries, many other continental European countries, England and Wales, Israel, and 
Canada. However, unlike some foreign systems that impose suspended sentences unaccompanied by 
probationary supervision, it appears that in U.S. guidelines systems suspended sentences for felony-level 
crimes are almost always combined with probation. The third option described in text is less widely used 
outside of the United States, but Finland applies an analogous rule: custodial sanctions are not authorized 
for violations of release conditions that do not involve a new criminal offense. See Tappio Lappi-Seppälä, 
Community Sanctions as Substitutes to Imprisonment in the Nordic Countries, 82 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. no. 1, 2019 at 17. 
 4.  The article does not address suspended fines. It likewise disregards most forms of pre-conviction 
conditional dismissal that impose probation-like conditions enforced with the threat of resumed 
prosecution (making them somewhat analogous to suspended imposition of sentence). Such informal 
“sentencing” options are not a part of any existing guidelines system; however, they are endorsed and 
regulated under the revised Model Penal Code. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING §§ 6.02 A–B 
(AM. LAW INST. 2017). 
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Decisions to impose and execute a prison sentence are treated more seriously, 
given the greater severity and disruptiveness of that sanction: prison terms 
usually have a maximum duration longer than one year and are served in a state-
run facility that is often geographically remote from the offender’s home 
community. The focus on prison sentences also means that this article examines 
only sentencing of felony-level crimes—in almost all U.S. jurisdictions, 
misdemeanor offenses are punishable with no more than one year of custody, to 
be served in a local jail or workhouse. The exclusion of misdemeanor sentences 
is also consistent with the article’s focus, explained below, on U.S. sentencing 
under guidelines, most of which only apply to felonies.5 
Second, the article examines backup custodial sanctions only in guidelines 
systems, even though each of the three options described above (and certainly 
the first two) can be found in many states without guidelines. It focuses on 
guidelines sentencing for three reasons: First, the actual impacts of different 
backup-sanction rules are easier to see in a guidelines system because, compared 
to non-guidelines sentencing, there is usually less of a gap between formal law 
and actual practice and more available data on sentences imposed. Second, 
guidelines can and do include sentencing rules that lessen the disadvantages of 
one or more of the three backup-sanction options—and do so in ways that are 
more predictable and effective than they would be in a non-guidelines system. 
Third, I am more familiar with these issues under guidelines sentencing, given my 
long-standing interest in this sentencing structure, and the detailed information 
the University of Minnesota has collected on these systems as part of our 
Sentencing Guidelines Resource Center.6 
A final preliminary comment also relates to the U.S. context and guidelines 
focus of this article: unlike in other nations, whose experiments with increased or 
decreased use of various kinds of suspended sentences are described in several 
articles in this issue, the use of suspended sentences appears to be a long-standing 
practice in U.S. guidelines jurisdictions, and one that showed little change when 
guidelines were adopted.7 Moreover, the frequency of probation and other non-
custodial sentences has remained fairly constant in U.S. state jurisdictions in 
 
 5.  When examining sentencing in the United States, another reason to focus solely on felony-level 
crimes is that there is no nationwide data on misdemeanor sentencing—the only sentencing data for the 
United States as a whole is limited to felonies. See, e.g., SEAN ROSENMERKEL ET AL., BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2006 – STATISTICAL TABLES (Dec. 2009), 
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=2152 [https://perma.cc/2MDV-J8CV]. 
 6.  The website of the Robina Institute’s Sentencing Guidelines Resource Center contains 
guidelines and other primary documents, detailed profiles and other background information for each 
system, and a growing collection of multi-jurisdictional overviews addressing various dimensions of 
guidelines sentencing and guidelines commissions. Univ. of Minn., Robina Inst. of Criminal Law & 
Criminal Justice, SENTENCING GUIDELINES RESOURCE CENTER, https://sentencing.umn.edu/ 
[https://perma.cc/77HQ-YEDE] (last visited Sept. 5, 2018). 
 7.  Washington State is the only U.S. guidelines jurisdiction that sought to make major changes in 
the use of suspended sentences. See infra, text accompanying notes 26–27. 
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recent decades.8 Thus, notwithstanding increased levels of overall sentence 
severity as reflected in steadily rising prison populations and incarceration rates, 
it appears that U.S. policymakers continue to believe in community-based 
programs and continue to support the rehabilitation and reintegration goals of 
suspended sentences and probation. 
II 
HOW SUSPENDED SENTENCES AND NON-PRISON BACKUP SANCTIONS ARE 
USED UNDER GUIDELINES 
The survey below begins with some further details about U.S. jurisdictions—
what counts as a guidelines system, and which jurisdictions have such a system. 
A. Where, When, and What Kinds of Guidelines 
For purposes of this article, a sentencing guidelines system is one with the 
following characteristics: 
1. Judges are given a set of recommended sentences for most crimes, or at 
least most felonies; 
2. The recommended sentences are deemed to be appropriate in typical 
cases, that is, cases not presenting aggravating or mitigating factors that 
might justify departure from the recommendation; 
3. Such recommended sentences are developed by a legislatively created 
sentencing guidelines commission, regardless of whether the rules are 
embodied in statutes and even if the commission ceased to exist at some 
point after the guidelines went into effect. 
This definition thus excludes legislatively drafted presumptive sentences like 
those that California and several other states adopted in the mid-to-late 1970s, 
without input from a sentencing commission.9 The existence of a commission, 
 
 8.  The estimated proportion of sentenced felons receiving probation or other non-custodial 
sanctions in state courts was 31 percent in both 1986 and 2006 (national sentencing data is not available 
for earlier or later years, and no separate estimates are provided for guidelines states). Biennial reports 
between 1986 and 2006 show probation rates that varied between 29 and 32 percent.  See PATRICK A. 
LANGAN, PH.D. & JOHN M. DAWSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PROFILE OF FELONS 
CONVICTED IN STATE COURTS, 1986 (Jan. 1990), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pfcsc86.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7C8C-X3GS]; ROSENMERKEL ET AL., supra note 5; Data Collection: National Judicial 
Reporting Program, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=dcdetail&iid= 
241 [https://perma.cc/7WPC-S48N] (collecting biennial reports on felony sentencing, 1986 2006) (last 
visited Nov. 4, 2018). In federal courts, however, the proportion of cases receiving non-custodial sanctions 
fell after the guidelines went into effect and was less than 8 percent in 2006. 2006 Sourcebook of Federal 
Sentencing Statistics, fig. D, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/ 
research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2006/FigD_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/J4LX-
2984] (last visited Sept. 6, 2018). 
 9.  Florida represents a borderline case because its commission-drafted guidelines were replaced in 
1998 with statutory presumptive minimum sentences; it is included in the survey because its current 
punishment code carries over elements of the former commission-drafted guidelines system. See Pamala 
L. Griset, Criminal Sentencing in Florida: Determinate Sentencing’s Hollow Shell, 45 CRIME & DELINQ. 
316 (1999). Massachusetts is another borderline case; it is included because, even though the state’s initial 
and revised commission-drafted guidelines have not received legislative approval, it appears that judges 
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especially one that remains in existence after the guidelines are implemented, is 
important when examining any issue of sentencing policy, including the different 
ways to structure backup sanctions for community-based sentences. Such a body 
can, and most commissions do, collect and analyze data on sentences imposed 
under the guidelines, on revocations or other sanctions for violations of the 
conditions of community sanctions, and on the ways in which sentencing and 
revocation decisions translate into higher or lower prison populations. 
The nineteen state and federal jurisdictions that currently have sentencing 
guidelines meeting the above definition are shown in Table 1. They are listed in 
order of the initial effective dates of their commission-drafted guidelines, 
alongside the years of operation of that jurisdiction’s guidelines commission. 
Besides the variations in their approaches to structuring community-based 
sanctions, discussed below in Subpart B, these nineteen systems also vary 
considerably in many other ways, including the degree to which recommended 
sentences are legally binding or only advisory; whether parole release discretion 
was retained or mostly abolished; and the manner in which prior record 
enhancements are used.10 But except as noted below, it does not seem that such 
variations undercut the comparability of the suspended-sentence and free-
standing backup sanctions discussed below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
generally follow the commission’s recommended sentences (so, in effect, the commission’s proposals are 
functioning like advisory guidelines). See MASS. SENTENCING COMM’N, SURVEY OF SENTENCING 
PRACTICES FY 2013 (2014), https://www.mass.gov/lists/surveys-of-massachusetts-sentencing-practices 
[https://perma.cc/L9Z7-MP4T]. Some researchers have classified Alaska as a “guidelines” system. See, 
e.g., NEAL B. KAUDER & BRIAN J. OSTROM, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES: PROFILES AND CONTINUUM 8 (July 2008), https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/ 
microsites/files/csi/state_sentencing_guidelines.ashx [https://perma.cc/X6X2-XZ4F]. However, that state 
is excluded because its statutory presumptive sentences were not developed by a commission (although 
they were later endorsed by a short-lived sentencing commission); rather, they were drafted by the 
legislature and supplemented with appellate case law adding additional presumptive sentences. See 
Teresa W. Carnes, Sentencing Reform in Alaska, 6 FED. SENT’G REP. 134 (1993). 
 10.  For reviews of U.S. guidelines systems as of 2004, 2012, and 2018, respectively, see Richard S. 
Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and Unresolved Policy Issues, 105 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1190 (2005); RICHARD S. FRASE, JUST SENTENCING: PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES FOR A 
WORKABLE SYSTEM (2012) [hereinafter FRASE, JUST SENTENCING]; and Richard S. Frase, 40 Years of 
American Sentencing Guidelines: What Have We Learned?, in 48 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF 
RESEARCH (Michael Tonry ed.) (forthcoming 2019). Prior record enhancements in U.S. guidelines 
systems are the subject of another Robina Institute project; for further details, visit Univ. of Minn., 
Robina Inst. of Criminal Law & Criminal Justice, Criminal History Enhancements, 
http://robinainstitute.umn.edu/areas-expertise/criminal-history-enhancements [https://perma.cc/ZA85-
GP5D] (last visited Sept. 6, 2018). 
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Table 1: U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Systems, as of June 201811 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B. Which Systems Use Each Approach to Structuring and Enforcing Probation 
Conditions? 
As shown in Table 2, U.S. guidelines systems use a variety of custodial backup 
sanctions, alone or in combination, to enforce conditions of probation and other 
community-based sentences.12 Suspended-execution prison sentences (SEPS) are 
 
 11.  Univ. of Minn., Robina Inst. of Criminal Law & Criminal Justice, supra note 6.   
 12.  The categorization shown in Table 2 disregards custodial backup sanctions that are only 
available for limited types of cases. In addition to cited works, other sources for this summary include the 
Univ. of Minn., Robina Inst. of Criminal Law & Criminal Justice, supra note 6, and descriptions of 
probation rules in ten guidelines systems that were compiled by another Robina project. ROBINA INST. 
OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROFILES IN PROBATION REVOCATION: EXAMINING THE 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN 21 STATES (Kelly Lyn Mitchell & Kevin R. Reitz eds., 2014), 
http://robinainstitute.umn.edu/publications/profiles-probation-revocation-examining-legal-framework-
21-states [https://perma.cc/7F5S-QDGB]. [hereinafter ROBINA INST. 2014]. Those ten states are: 
 
 
Jurisdiction 
 
Guidelines 
Commissions —
years in operation 
 
Years when each 
commission’s 
guidelines first 
went into effect 
Minnesota      1978–     1980 
Pennsylvania      1978–    1982 
Maryland      1996–    1983 
Florida    1982–1997    1983  
Washington      1981–    1984 
Delaware      1984–    1987 
Federal courts      1984–    1987 
Oregon       1985–    1989 
Tennessee    1986–1995    1989 
Kansas      1989–      1993 
Arkansas      1993–     1994 
No. Carolina       1990–    1994 
Virginia      1994–    1995 
Massachusetts      1994–     1996  
Ohio      1990–     1996 
Utah      1983–    1998 
Michigan 1994–2002, 2015–    1999 
Washington, D.C.      1998–      2004 
Alabama      2006–     2006 
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available for all cases in twelve of the nineteen guidelines systems; SEPS is the 
sole option in five systems and one of several options in seven systems. 
Suspended-imposition sentences (SIS) are available for all cases in eleven of the 
systems; SIS is the sole option in four systems and one of several options in seven 
systems. The third alternative, using jail (or occasionally, short prison terms) as 
backup sanctions, is authorized in five systems, two of which rely on jail terms as 
the sole custodial backup sanction for most cases. 
 
Table 2: Available Custodial Backup Sanctions [CBS] For Violations of 
Probation Conditions, In U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Systems13 
 
Suspended-execution Prison Sentence [SEPS] only  Alabama 
District of Columbia 
Kansas 
Maryland 
Tennessee  
Suspended-imposition of Sentence [SIS] only Arkansas 
Florida 
Michigan 
Pennsylvania 
SEPS and SIS are both available in most cases Delaware 
Massachusetts 
Minnesota 
Ohio 
Virginia  
SEPS and/or SIS available, non-prison CBS 
encouraged* 
Federal courts (SIS) 
North Carolina (SEPS) 
Utah (SEPS and SIS) 
Only non-prison CBS are available in most cases*  Oregon 
Washington 
* See text for further details on these systems. 
 
The two suspended-sentence options each operate in a fairly similar manner 
in the indicated jurisdictions, as described at the outset of this article. At the time 
of the initial sentencing under SEPS or the deferred sentencing under SIS, judges 
either elect a specific sentence from within the range of prison terms authorized 
for that offender’s conviction offense and prior record or impose a longer or 
shorter term based on a finding of aggravating or mitigating offense 
 
Alabama, Florida, Massachusetts, Minnesota, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah, and 
Washington. Tennessee is not profiled in either of the Robina sources cited above; that state’s backup-
sanction rules are found in TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-303(C)(1) (2018). 
   13.  Univ. of Minn., Robina Inst. of Criminal Law & Criminal Justice, supra note 6.   
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circumstances. When a SEPS or SIS sentence is used to sanction violations of 
release conditions, some systems allow judges to execute part of the prison 
sentence while suspending or continuing to suspend the remainder; other systems 
require the judge to execute the entire prison term. 
Greater variation is found among the five systems using more limited 
custodial backup sanctions. For most offenders in Oregon and Washington, 
probation is a truly free-standing penalty, not a condition of a suspended 
sentence, and jail commitment is the only authorized custodial backup sanction 
for violation of release conditions—prison is off the table. By contrast, the federal 
courts, North Carolina, and Utah combine probation with a suspended sentence 
which could be revoked, but courts are encouraged—and sometimes required—
to use shorter custodial backup sanctions.14 
Here is some further detail on each of these five systems and on the 
corresponding provisions of the revised Model Penal Code: 
1. Federal Courts 
This guidelines system combines limited custodial backup sanctions with 
suspended imposition sentences. The Guidelines Manual15 regulates sanctioning 
of probation violations in three ways. First, it defines three grades of violation 
seriousness: violations that are criminal offenses are ranked according to the 
authorized maximum penalty for that offense, and the lowest grade also includes 
non-criminal violations. Second, the Manual specifies which kinds of violations 
merit revocation of probation. Third, it provides, for each violation grade, ranges 
of recommended custodial terms and permissible substitutions of home or other 
residential detention that courts may impose as sanctions for probation 
violations. These custodial terms are often shorter than the applicable 
recommended sentence range for the conviction offense. However, unlike all 
state guidelines that include limited custodial backup sanctions, many of the 
federal ranges are partly or entirely above one year in length, the traditional 
minimum prison duration. 
Moreover, all of the federal guidelines provisions summarized above are 
“policy statements,” not formal “guidelines,” and judges were not required to 
follow them even when the formal guidelines were legally binding—that is, 
before Booker v. United States16 rendered the guidelines advisory. Furthermore, 
federal sentencing statutes provide that, when probation is revoked, the judge is 
permitted to impose any sentence that would have been authorized by statutes 
and guidelines for the conviction offense.17 This means that, functionally, all 
 
 14.  These five systems also differ in another respect: three of the systems (North Carolina, Oregon, 
and Washington) have legally binding guidelines enforced with appellate review; in the other two systems 
(Utah and the federal courts), guidelines rules and policy statements are advisory, with little or no 
substantive appellate review. 
 15.  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 7B1.1–1.4. (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016). 
 16.  Booker v. United States, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 17.  18 U.S.C. § 3565 (2012). 
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federal probation sentences represent deferred (SIS) sentencing—prison is never 
completely off the table. 
2. North Carolina 
Like the federal system, North Carolina combines limited custodial backup 
sanctions with the possibility of revoking a suspended sentence, but the latter is 
always SEPS—judges must impose a prison term in all felony cases but may then 
suspend its execution.18 Since 2011, revocation to prison has not been allowed for 
the first two technical violations of felony probation conditions (violations other 
than absconding or the commission of a new offense); instead, courts may impose 
a jail term of up to 90 days per violation.19 And since 2012, probation officers have 
had authority to sanction release violations with a “quick dip” jail term of two or 
three days—up to six days per month in each of three months. These quick dip 
sanctions can be imposed without a court hearing if the offender consents, which 
they almost always do; the use of this option grew almost ten-fold from 2013 to 
2017.20 
3. Utah 
Like the two systems described above, Utah combines free-standing, non-
prison backup sanctions with the possibility of revoking a suspended sentence 
which, as in North Carolina, is always SEPS.21 The Utah guidelines22 recommend 
a series of graduated sanctions for probation violations, beginning with non-
custodial sanctions and then moving to increasingly severe custodial options. 
Probation officers may, with written court or probation agency approval, impose 
up to five jail days in a 30-day period, with one to three jail days per sanction. 
When the court holds a full hearing, the following recommended and 
maximum jail sanctions apply: for an offender’s first release-revocation within a 
probation sentence, 15 jail days (30 day maximum) may be imposed; for the 
second release-revocation within the same probation sentence, 30 jail days (60 
days maximum) may be imposed; and for the third and subsequent release-
revocations, 45 jail days (90 days maximum). The court may revoke probation 
and execute the suspended prison term if it finds that the offender’s conduct on 
probation “presents a substantial threat to public safety which cannot be 
addressed through behavior modification sanctions,” as illustrated by the 
 
 18.  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1342(c) (2018). 
 19.  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1344 (2018). 
 20.  N.C. SENTENCING & POLICY ADVISORY COMM’N, JUSTICE REINVESTMENT ACT: 
IMPLEMENTATION EVALUATION REPORT 2018 at 21 (Apr. 15, 2018), https://www.nccourts.gov/ 
documents/publications/jra-implementation-evaluation-report [https://perma.cc/54CN-JXX6]. 
 21.  Unless a prison term is mandatory, judges have authority to impose a prison sentence and then 
suspend its execution. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-1(2)(a) (West 2018). Judges may also utilize a de facto 
SIS procedure, plea in abeyance, as discussed in text infra. 
 22.  UTAH SENTENCING COMM’N, 2017 ADULT SENTENCING & RELEASE GUIDELINES 41 (Oct. 1, 
2017), https://justice.utah.gov/Sentencing/Guidelines/Adult/2017%20Adult%20Sentencing%20and 
%20Release%20Guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/LLF4-FMF]. 
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following examples: conduct involving “dangerous weapons, fleeing via high 
speed chase, violent arrest behavior, new person crime allegations, high priority 
CCC [community corrections center] walk[a]ways; [designated] sex offender[s], 
repeat DUI violations, [and] person crime absconder[s].”23 
Finally, although the term “suspended imposition of sentence” is not used, 
Utah’s formal “plea in abeyance” procedure has most of the attributes of SIS and 
is classified as SIS for present purposes. This procedure permits the court to 
accept a guilty or nolo contendere plea pursuant to the parties’ plea-in-abeyance 
agreement, defer sentencing, and impose probation-like conditions; if those 
conditions are violated the court may enter judgment of conviction and impose 
any sentence authorized for the offense to which the original plea was entered.24 
4. Oregon 
This is the guidelines jurisdiction that has gone the furthest to replace 
suspended prison sentences with free-standing, non-prison custodial backup 
sanctions for violations of probation conditions. SEPS and SIS are only allowed 
for certain sex offenders.25 However, a deferred sentencing option equivalent to 
SIS applies to offenders who received probation by means of a downward 
dispositional departure from a recommended-prison sentence or who were 
convicted in a guidelines grid cell where either prison or probation is allowed.26 
In all other cases, the guidelines provide only non-prison custodial sanctions for 
violations of probation conditions. All grid cells with recommended-probation 
sentences are grouped into three zones, from the least to the most serious 
combination of current offense severity and prior record. Depending on the zone, 
if probation is continued—that is, not revoked—violations of conditions can be 
sanctioned with up to one, 1.5, or two months in jail. If probation is revoked, the 
offender can be further sanctioned with up to six months in jail. Thus, total pre-
revocation plus post-revocation custodial sanctions for probation violations are 
seven, 7.5, or eight months in jail, depending on the grid zone. 
5. Washington 
Although Washington abolished most suspended sentences when it adopted 
guidelines, it still makes some use of both SEPS and SIS, as well as free-standing 
probation with non-prison custodial backup sanctions. SEPS is only authorized 
 
 23.  Id. at 42. 
 24.  UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-2a-2–4 (West 2018). A number of other guidelines states (such as 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, North Carolina, Ohio, and Pennsylvania) also employ pre-conviction 
probation-like orders. ROBINA INST. 2014, supra note 12. However these various forms of pretrial 
diversion appear to be less structured and have less formal court involvement, so for purposes of the 
present study they are not deemed to be the functional equivalent of SIS. 
 25.  OR. REV. STAT. § 137.010(3) (2018); OR. ADMIN. R. 213-005-0008(2)(c) (2018). 
 26.  There are three such “border boxes,” located along a line on the grid separating recommended-
prison cells from recommended-probation cells. When probation is ordered in such a case, or by means 
of downward departure in a recommended-prison cell, “the sentence upon revocation shall be a prison 
term up to the maximum presumptive prison term which could have been imposed initially, if the 
presumptive prison term exceeds 12 months.” OR. ADMIN. R. 213-010-0002(2) (2018). 
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for sex offenders and certain drug-dependent offenders. SIS is not formally 
authorized at all, but the deferred sentencing option applied to certain custodial-
parent and drug-dependent offenders is functionally equivalent to SIS. If such an 
offender violates the conditions of release, the court may impose any sentence 
within the applicable standard guidelines range for that offense and offender 
prior record. For all other offenders, violations of conditional release—usually 
referred to as “community custody,” not probation—may only be sanctioned 
with jail terms. An administrative hearing officer may, depending on the 
seriousness and frequency of violations, impose any of the following: non-
custodial sanctions for a first low-level violation; up to three days in jail for a 
second or subsequent low-level violation; and up to 30 days in jail for a high-level 
violation. In addition, the sentencing court may impose up to 60 days in jail per 
violation.27 
6. Revised Model Penal Code Provisions 
Although suspended sentences (SEPS or SIS) are the preferred backup 
sanction among existing U.S. guidelines systems, they are not preferred under the 
recently approved revisions to the sentencing and corrections provisions of the 
Model Penal Code. The Code does not authorize SIS, and only authorizes SEPS 
in optional language indicated in brackets.28 Instead, the Code treats probation 
as a free-standing sentence, with its own custodial sanctions for violations of 
conditions. But, unlike most of the free-standing custodial sanctions in existing 
guidelines systems, the Code’s custodial sanctions for release violations are not 
limited to jail terms—authorized sanctions for probation violations include 
imprisonment for the full term of the supervision period, which can be as long as 
three years in felony cases.29 
7. The Revocation Decision Itself 
Regardless of the form in which community-based sanctions are imposed, 
judges in almost all guidelines systems, and under the revised Model Penal Code, 
retain broad or even total discretion when deciding whether to revoke release 
and, with or without revocation, which of the available backup sanctions to 
impose for violations of release conditions. 
 
 27.  ROBINA INST. 2014, supra note 12. For further details on Washington’s rules, see FRASE, JUST 
SENTENCING, supra note 10, at 142–44. 
 28.  MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.02(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2017). The original (1962) 
version of the Code took the opposite approach, authorizing suspended imposition but not suspended 
execution. Perhaps one reason for the omission of suspended imposition in the revised Code is that some 
of that option’s functions are served by the revised Code’s provisions for Deferred Prosecution and 
Deferred Adjudication. See discussion supra, note 4. Like some state systems (including Alabama, 
Minnesota, and North Carolina), the Code also provides that, when a court revokes probation that was 
combined with a suspended-execution sentence, the court may execute the prison sentence or impose 
custodial or other sanctions less severe than the suspended prison term. MODEL PENAL CODE: 
SENTENCING § 6.15(3)(e) (AM. LAW INST. 2017). 
 29.  Id. §§ 6.03(5), 6.15(3)(e). 
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III 
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF EACH APPROACH TO STRUCTURING 
AND ENFORCING PROBATION CONDITIONS 
What are the policy arguments in favor of using each of the three main types 
of backup sanctions described above? If one were only concerned with 
minimizing prison commitments, a version of the third option, found in two of 
the state guidelines systems (Oregon and Washington), would appear to be best. 
Probation is imposed as a free-standing penalty, and prison is effectively off the 
table—violations of the conditions of probation are sanctioned only with non-
custodial measures and local jail terms. The latter are almost always much shorter 
than prison terms and are served closer to the offender’s home community; jail 
sanctions are usually also much more compatible with visiting and with day-time 
release for work, education, training, or treatment. 
And yet, as noted in Part II, no U.S. guidelines system uses the third option 
for all felony cases, and only five of the nineteen systems use it at all. Are these 
policy choices just a reflection of the overly punitive character of U.S. 
sentencing? Or are there disadvantages to using the third option, or advantages 
to using one or both of the suspended-sentence options? How do SEPS and SIS 
compare to each other? And even if the primary concern is to minimize prison 
populations—to lessen the costs, burdens, and adverse consequences of 
imprisonment, and maximize the rehabilitative and reintegrative advantages of 
community-based sentences—is there any evidence that a system’s choice of 
backup sanctions actually contributes to a relatively higher or lower prison rate? 
The answers to these questions will be explored in the subparts below, which 
first examine the pros and cons of each option and then move on to some broader 
issues. 
A. Suspended-Execution Prison Sentences (SEPS) 
1. Advantages 
Compared to SIS or more limited custodial backup sanctions, one potential 
advantage of imposing but then suspending a specified prison term is that it may 
give the offender a more concrete incentive to comply with release conditions.30 
In addition, both SEPS and SIS leave substantial room for later tightening of 
sanctions in case of noncooperation or new—or at least unforeseen—indications 
of offender risk. Modern criminal justice systems need effective mechanisms to 
encourage and reward the offender’s cooperation with release conditions and to 
respond to lack of cooperation or heightened risk; limited custodial backup 
sanctions may lack both sufficient compliance incentives and sufficient scope to 
tighten sanctions in light of the offender’s conduct or changed circumstances 
while on probation. 
 
 30.  See Joan Petersilia, Probation in the United States, in 22 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF 
RESEARCH, 149, 163 (Michael Tonry ed., 1997). 
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Another potential advantage of SEPS is that the duration of the suspended 
term can provide a valuable expressive statement of conviction-offense 
seriousness. This statement is made at a point in time—soon after entry of a guilty 
plea or guilty verdict—when the court is most familiar with the facts of that 
offense; the court’s choice of a prison term within the recommended guidelines 
range, or any higher or lower term that is entered by departing from the range, 
can thus reflect any case specific aggravating or mitigating offense circumstances. 
Many writers have argued, from retributive, communicative, or utilitarian 
perspectives, that punishment serves important expressive, censuring purposes. 
It conveys to the offender, to other would-be offenders, and to the general public 
not only the wrongfulness and harmfulness of the crime, but the degree of 
wrongfulness and harmfulness relative to other crimes.31 The length of a 
suspended-execution prison term also sends the important expressive message 
that, even though a particular offender was deemed a low-enough risk to be put 
on probation, his crime was a serious wrong against the victims, society, or both. 
Although some writers have argued that the expressive function of 
punishment requires “hard treatment” in the form of actual incarceration, fine 
payment, or other concrete measures,32 other writers have argued that it does 
not33—that expressive values can effectively be served by symbolic statements of 
crime seriousness such as those conveyed by offense grading and authorized 
penalties, recommended guidelines sentences for typical forms of each offense, 
and the severity of suspended prison terms and fines. As indicated in Part II, most 
guidelines systems, like many systems lacking guidelines, make regular use of 
suspended prison sentences—a form of conditional hard treatment that in most 
cases is never actually carried out. If and when a suspended prison term is 
executed, however, it repeats and emphasizes the expressive, norm-reinforcing 
message about the seriousness of the offender’s crime. By contrast, and as further 
discussed below, free-standing backup sanctions—and, in most cases, also SIS—
 
 31.  See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING (AM. LAW INST. 2017); MODEL PENAL CODE 
(AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962); R. ANTONY DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, 
AND COMMUNITY (2001); ALFRED C. EWING, THE MORALITY OF PUNISHMENT (1929); JOEL 
FEINBERG, THE EXPRESSIVE FUNCTION OF PUNISHMENT, IN DOING AND DESERVING (Joel Feinberg 
ed., 1970); FRASE, JUST SENTENCING, supra note 10; Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, in ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF CRIME AND JUSTICE (Joshua Dressler ed., 2d ed. 2001); HERBERT L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND 
RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1968); John Kleinig, The Hardness of Hard 
Treatment, in FUNDAMENTALS OF SENTENCING THEORY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ANDREW VON 
HIRSCH (Andrew Ashworth & Martin Wasik eds., 1998); NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF 
IMPRISONMENT (1974); IGOR PRIMORATZ, JUSTIFYING LEGAL PUNISHMENT (1989); PAUL H. 
ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW: WHO SHOULD BE PUNISHED? HOW 
MUCH? (2008); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS (1993); Johannes Andenaes, The 
General Preventative Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 949 (1966); Jean Hampton, The Moral 
Education Theory of Punishment, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 208 (1984); Henry M. Hart, The Aims of the 
Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401 (Summer 1958); Dan Markel, Executing Retributivism: 
Panetti and the Future of the Eighth Amendment, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1163 (2009); Herbert Morris, A 
Paternalistic Theory of Punishment, 18 AM. PHIL. Q. 263 (1981). 
 32.  See, e.g., Duff, supra note 31. 
 33.  See, e.g., Ewing, supra note 31; H.M. Hart, supra note 31; Feinberg, supra note 31. 
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lack the symbolic expressive value of a SEPS, and the reinforcing message of 
crime seriousness when backup sanctions are imposed. 
A further advantage of SEPS is that, because the prison term is imposed at 
the time of trial or guilty plea, this option will likely better assure proportionality 
and consistency in the use of custodial backup sanctions, compared to either SIS 
or jail backup sanctions. As further discussed in Subpart E below, proportionality 
of punishment relative to the seriousness of the conviction offense, and 
consistency among offenders committing the same offense in the same manner 
(also referred to as parity or uniformity), are important values not just under a 
retributive theory of punishment but also from a utilitarian (crime-control) 
perspective, and it is especially important to avoid disproportionately severe 
punishment. When an offender is sent to prison solely for violation of probation 
conditions, with no conviction for a new offense, his imprisonment represents 
punishment for the crime that led to the probation sentence, so the prison term 
should be proportionate to the seriousness of that crime. 
By contrast, when the conditions of SIS probation are violated, it is very likely 
that backup sanctions will be inconsistently applied and not reflect the relative 
seriousness of the offender’s original conviction offense. Instead, the backup-
sanction prison term is likely to be heavily influenced by the nature of the 
offender’s probation violation, by a perceived need for strong deterrence of such 
violations, or by the court’s annoyance at the offender’s lack of cooperation. 
SEPS probation avoids these distortions, since the appropriate prison term for 
the conviction offense will already have been determined at the time the offender 
was placed on probation. 
As for jail backup sanctions, the five jurisdictions that use this option as the 
primary or encouraged sanction for release violations do not structure these 
sanctions in ways designed to promote offense proportionality and consistency, 
although it would be possible to do so. Instead, these jurisdictions generally 
prescribe a single maximum jail penalty for all probation violations or for large 
groups of offenders. On the other hand, the relatively short duration of jail terms 
limits the potential for serious inconsistency within the group of offenders 
receiving probation. 
2. Disadvantages 
The most serious potential problems with the use of SEPS are overuse of 
prison as a backup sanction and net-widening. As to the first, there is a risk of 
excessive frequency of revocation to prison because judges may take the easiest 
course, or think “I already decided that,” and reflexively execute the suspended 
prison term. As for net-widening, there are multiple dimensions to this problem. 
First, at the time of sentencing the judge and other participants may pay 
insufficient attention to the duration of the prison term if everyone expects that 
term to be suspended and never served. Second, since the offender is ostensibly 
being given a break by having his prison term suspended, the judge may be 
inclined to impose excessive conditions of the suspension. Third, if the offender 
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later violates any of those conditions—which is all the more likely with excessive 
conditions—the judge may feel that he or she must respond by executing the 
suspended prison sentence, even if the judge would have agreed at the time of 
initial sentencing that such an executed prison term would be too severe. 
However, there are ways to mitigate all of the problems noted above. 
Reflexive overuse of prison as a backup sanction can be discouraged by rules that 
provide guidance and promote restraint in the use of that sanction, that authorize 
and encourage the use of shorter jail terms instead of prison, and that explicitly 
allow partial execution of the suspended prison term.34 As for the net-widening 
problem, sentencing guidelines can, and most do, restrain the severity of 
recommended suspended prison sentences by specifying their normal durational 
range, just as they do for recommended executed sentences, and by requiring 
courts to give written reasons, consistent with guidelines policies, for deviating 
from the normal duration. To make this work well, however, defense counsel 
must recognize that many of their clients are going to violate conditions, and that 
counsel thus needs to protect the future as well as the present interests of the 
client. As for the risk of judges piling on extra probation conditions that then 
make violation and revocation more likely, some state guidelines have limited 
excessive probation conditions in one of two ways. Oregon specifies the 
maximum number of “punishment units,” calculated using equivalency formulas 
to accommodate different types of probation conditions, that can be imposed in 
each guidelines grid cell carrying a recommended probation sentence. Minnesota 
gives offenders the right to refuse probation and accept immediate execution of 
the recommended suspended prison term if the proposed probation conditions 
are more onerous than the applicable prison term would be. 
Another potential disadvantage of SEPS, compared to SIS, is that the former 
limits the judge’s ability to impose a more severe prison sentence in response to 
either serious but unforeseen offender risk factors that become apparent once 
the offender is on probation, or the seriousness of release violation conduct, 
especially criminal conduct. However, as noted above, any executed prison 
sentence should be proportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s original 
conviction offense. When judges revoke SIS probation and sentence the offender 
to prison, that prison term can exceed proportionality limits if the term is based 
on post-offense behavior, perceived needs for deterrence, or annoyance rather 
than on the conviction offense itself. Moreover, there are serious legality and 
fairness problems when SIS revocation yields a prison sentence that is enhanced 
because of alleged new criminal conduct which has not been admitted or proven 
in accordance with proof beyond a reasonable doubt and other procedural 
requirements. 
 
 34.  However, the option of partial execution, in response to release violations, undercuts one of the 
supposed advantages of SEPS—the increased compliance incentive of a specified suspended prison term. 
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B. Suspended Imposition of Sentence (SIS) 
1. Advantages 
SIS may, in comparison to SEPS, lessen or avoid the risk of excessive 
revocations to prison, thus lowering prison costs, avoiding net-widening, and 
sparing a larger proportion of offenders from having any kind of prison sentence 
on their record. The requirement to hold a full sentencing hearing, instead of just 
summarily executing the previously-imposed prison term, or part of it, tends to 
discourage SIS revocations. And even if the court holds the hearing, imposes a 
prison sentence, and orders revocation to prison, it may feel less bound to execute 
the full sentence than if that sentence had already been imposed at an earlier 
sentencing hearing. In some cases, deferred sentencing might also be less punitive 
than imposition of a prison term at the time of entry of the guilty plea or guilty 
verdict because, with the passage of time, cooler emotions may reduce the 
pressures for greater severity from the community, the victim, or both. Of course, 
lower punishment severity at a deferred sentencing hearing, due to reduced 
victim or community concern about the conviction offense, could result in a 
penalty that is disproportionately lenient relative to that offense. But as further 
discussed in Subpart E below, there are principled as well as practical reasons to 
err on the side of leniency rather than severity when punishing offenders. 
Another advantage of suspended imposition, in some jurisdictions, is the 
beneficial effect it can have on the offender’s conviction record. If he complies 
with all conditions and is discharged from probation, the offender may be eligible 
to have the conviction expunged or re-categorized as a lower degree of crime. 
For example, under Minnesota law, when an offender is discharged from a SIS 
for a felony-level crime, the conviction offense is thereafter deemed a 
misdemeanor.35 For this reason, and also because the practice is supported by 
guidelines commentary,36 suspended imposition is often used in low-level felony 
cases, especially for first-time offenders. The expungement or offense-lowering 
effect of suspended imposition can be quite valuable for disadvantaged and other 
marginally employable offenders, as well as those whose chosen career would be 
jeopardized by a felony record. Of course, these same benefits could also be 
achieved under SEPS by simply extending the expungement or offense-lowering 
provisions to those sentences.37 
SIS might also be better than SEPS from a crime control perspective because 
the former allows the court to impose a sentence that accounts for the most recent 
information about the offender’s degree of recidivism risk. Where that risk level 
 
 35.  MINN. STAT. § 609.13 (2018). 
 36.  MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY cmt. 3.A.101 (MINN. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES COMM’N 2017). 
 37.  This option can be provided regardless of how probation is structured. For example, in 
Washington (which makes use of both free-standing probation and, for some types of cases, suspended 
sentences), offenders convicted of nonviolent crimes can move to withdraw their guilty plea and clear 
their conviction record after they have successfully completed probation or community control. See 
ROBINA INST. 2014, supra note 12, at 87. 
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is higher than was anticipated at the time of initial sentencing, the judge can 
impose a longer sentence than he or she might have imposed at the earlier stage 
of processing. But, as previously noted, that advantage may be outweighed by the 
risk that, when suspended-imposition probation is revoked, the prison sentence 
imposed will be disproportionately severe, inconsistent across offenders, or based 
on unproven allegations of new criminal activity. 
2. Disadvantages 
SIS provides a less concrete compliance incentive than SEPS. The latter says 
to the offender: “this will be your custody sentence if you do not cooperate.” SIS 
also makes a much less effective expressive statement about the seriousness of 
the offender’s crime. A suspended-execution sentence says to the offender and 
the public: “this is how serious the crime was.” By contrast, the court never gets 
the opportunity to send that message if it suspends imposition and the offender 
complies with all probation conditions and is discharged. In that case, only the 
authorized statutory penalty and any applicable presumptive guidelines 
suspended prison sentence express offense seriousness. But statutory maximums 
are almost always an excessive indicator of crime seriousness because they are 
based on the worst ways of committing the crime. Guidelines presumptive 
sentences do a better job of expressing crime seriousness, but they assume a 
typical offense and offender. Retributive and expressive punishment goals 
require judges, using their durational departure powers, to impose a specific 
prison term that reflects any case-specific aggravating or mitigating 
circumstances. Those circumstances can be more accurately assessed at the initial 
sentencing—when the offense details are fresh in the minds of all parties—than 
in a deferred sentencing that will be held months or even years later. Moreover, 
as previously noted, any prison term imposed in a later revocation hearing is 
likely to be strongly influenced by the offender’s recent violations of release 
conditions, and less reflective of the crime for which he is actually being sent to 
prison. Finally, suspended-imposition sentences are subject to many of the same 
risks of net-widening as were discussed above in connection with suspended-
execution sentences. Judges may be tempted to impose excessive conditions of 
the suspension and may later feel obligated to punish violations of those 
conditions—which are all the more likely to be violated, if they are excessive—
resulting in the imprisonment of an offender whose crimes do not justify an 
executed-prison sentence. 
C. Free-Standing Probation with Only Non-Prison Custodial Backup Sanctions 
1. Advantages 
As suggested earlier, this approach—especially if not combined with either 
kind of suspended sentence—seems likely to produce more parsimonious use of 
imprisonment. If prison is essentially taken off the table, once probation is 
granted, there can be no risk of unnecessary and excessive revocations to prison, 
and the offender will never get any kind of prison record. 
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2. Disadvantages 
Although lesser, non-prison breach sanctions are more parsimonious, in some 
cases they may provide insufficient incentive for offender compliance. Moreover, 
if judges fear the sentence is insufficient, they may hesitate to pronounce a 
community-based sentence in the first place. The fact that no guidelines 
jurisdiction has completely abandoned the use of suspended-execution and 
suspended-imposition sentences for all felony crimes seems to reflect a 
widespread belief that the threat of a specified suspended prison term, or at least 
a possible prison term, is sometimes needed to ensure compliance with all 
important conditions of probation. In any case, even if non-prison breach 
sanctions are effective and parsimonious, these sanctions can be incorporated 
into a suspended-execution or suspended-imposition regime, as North Carolina 
and Utah have done. Courts can be directed to use the shorter jail options first 
and use the ultimate sanction of revocation to prison only as a last resort. 
As with SIS, another problem with a free-standing probation sentence is that 
it conveys no expressive value beyond the conviction itself. Unlike a suspended-
execution custody term, a free-standing probation order provides no 
authoritative, case-specific pronouncement about the severity of this offender’s 
crime. 
It may also be difficult, when relying solely on jail terms to sanction probation 
violations, to maintain sanction proportionality relative to the offender’s 
conviction offense. In systems that use SEPS or SIS and that show the durations 
of recommended prison terms in a grid format, these durations display steadily 
increasing penalty severity as offense severity increases (usually along the vertical 
axis of the sentencing grid), and as criminal history category increases (usually 
along the horizontal axis). As illustrated in Figure 1, the Minnesota main 
guidelines grid, there are no major jumps or discontinuities when one crosses the 
heavy dark “disposition” line which separates grid cells recommending probation 
with a specified suspended prison term from cells just over the line 
recommending an immediately-executed prison sentence.38 Granted—and as 
further discussed in Subpart E below—there can be major jumps in penalty 
severity as one crosses the disposition line, between offenders below the line who 
are recommended for and successfully complete probation, and the only 
modestly more serious offenders just above the line who are recommended for 
and receive immediate prison. But at least among offenders who end up in 
prison—those on one side of the disposition line who were sent directly to prison, 
and those on the other side who were imprisoned after revocation of probation—
the prison terms served by offenders are relatively proportional to offense 
severity and criminal history; there are no major jumps in penalty severity 
between revoked offenders on the probation side of the line and those on the 
prison side who are directly sent to prison. 
 
 38.  MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY § 4.A. The single figure in cells above 
and to the right of the disposition line is deemed to be the most appropriate executed prison term, but a 
range is provided within which judges may sentence without meeting “departure” requirements. 
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Figure 1: Minnesota Main Grid (all felonies except sex crimes and drug crimes) 
Presumptive Sentence Lengths in Months 
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Such jumps, or “cliffs,” are much more likely to occur in a system that only 
allows probation violations to be sanctioned with jail terms. For example, cliffs 
can be seen in the excerpt from the Oregon guidelines grid shown in Table 3, by 
comparing the penalty ranges39 for low-criminal-history offenders just above and 
just below the disposition line—offenders in Criminal History Categories F, G, 
H, and I, at Offense Severity levels 7 and 8. For these low-history offenders, 
penalties are on average 270 percent higher at Offense Severity level 8 than at 
level 7. This dramatic increase in severity is much greater than the average 
penalty increase of 91 percent for low-history offenders at level 9, compared to 
level 8. Table 3 also shows a substantial “plateau” effect: low history offenders at 
Offense Severity levels 6 and 7 who violate probation conditions all have the 
same zero- to eleven-month range of custodial penalties; sanction severity is not 
proportionate to the offender’s Offense Severity level and Criminal History 
Category. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 39.  OR. ADMIN. R. 213-004-0001 (2018). In order to compare custody-sentence severity for 
offenders with recommended executed prison sentences above the disposition line (Severity level 8) with 
custody sentences applied to probation violators below the line (Severity level 7), it is necessary to take 
into account three types of custody available for the latter offenders: jail terms that can be imposed as a 
condition of probation (up to 3 months); additional jail sanctions that can be imposed for probation 
violators without revoking probation (up to 2 months); and further jail sanctions that can be imposed 
after probation has been revoked (up to 6 months). Accordingly, the effective range of custodial sanctions 
for Severity level 7 offenders below the disposition line has a maximum of 11 months (3 + 2 + 6). And 
since judges have discretion to impose no jail time under all three custody types, the effective floor of the 
total custody range is zero. 
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Table 3: Oregon Sentencing Guidelines Grid Excerpt (Offense Severity levels 6 
to 9), Illustrating “Cliff” and “Plateau” Effects Created When Probation 
Violations Are Only Sanctioned with Jail Time *    
3. Summary 
The most important potential advantages and disadvantages of each of the 
three ways of structuring custodial backup sanctions, discussed above, are listed 
in Table 4. A guidelines jurisdiction might view any of these three structures as 
best overall, depending on which policy goals and undesired collateral 
consequences that jurisdiction deems to be most important. 
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Table 4: Three Principal Ways to Structure Custodial Backup Sanctions [CBS], 
Employed in U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Systems: Potential Advantages and 
Disadvantages of Each Structure 
 
D. Some Common Problems in the Use of Community-Based Sentences 
Regardless of whether probation is imposed as a condition of SEPS, SIS, or a 
free-standing probation order with its own, more limited backup sanctions, there 
 
 
 
 
Advantages 
 
Disadvantages 
Suspended-
execution Prison 
Sentence [SEPS] 
• Concrete compliance 
incentive for offenders 
• Offense-seriousness 
expressive value of SEPS 
terms 
• Proportionality of CBS to 
the seriousness of conviction 
offenses 
• Least parsimonious—too 
many knee-jerk and 
unnecessary revocations to 
prison 
• Greatest risk of net-widening 
(revocation to prison of 
offenders who don’t belong 
there) 
• Pre-determined CBS maxima 
can’t fully accommodate 
unforeseen or increased 
offender risk  
Suspended-
imposition of 
Sentence [SIS] 
• Compared with SEPS, 
fewer prison commitments 
(so less cost, and fewer 
offenders with a prison 
record) 
• CBS severity can be based 
on the latest offender risk 
information  
• Compared with SEPS, less 
concrete compliance incentive 
for offenders 
• Moderate net-widening risk 
• Lost expressive value of 
SEPS terms 
• Less proportionate CBS 
durations 
Free-standing 
Probation with 
only jail (not 
prison) CBS 
• Fewest prison 
commitments (so no net-
widening, lowest cost, and 
fewest offenders with a 
prison record) 
• Least compliance incentive 
for offenders 
• (as a result of above) Judges 
may grant fewer probations 
• Least offense-seriousness 
expressive value 
• Least offense-proportionate 
CBS durations 
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is a risk of excessively severe probation conditions,40 leading to inevitable 
violations and pressure to impose custodial sanctions to respond to those 
violations. As noted previously, the judge may be tempted to impose excessively 
severe or numerous probation conditions if he or she feels, or the prosecutor 
strongly argues, that the offender is being given a break by not being immediately 
sent to prison. Excessive intermediate sanctions then lead to problems of 
enforceability, disproportionality, and net-widening. To guard against the 
imposition of excessive probation conditions, guidelines should include the 
following provisions, some of which are already found in some state systems: 
1. The starting point, or presumption, for judges should be that no conditions 
of probation other than the requirement to obey the law are needed. Probation 
conditions should then be imposed only if and to the extent that the judge finds 
that they are necessary, likely to achieve applicable sentencing purposes in a cost-
effective manner, and not disproportionately excessive relative to the seriousness 
of the offender’s conviction offense and prior record. The effect of this start-at-
zero presumption is that there are no formal requirements of minimum severity 
in the use of probation or other community-based sanctions. This is consistent 
with the widely recognized principle of parsimony—sanctions should be no more 
severe than necessary to achieve their crime-control purposes. It is also consistent 
with a limiting retributive model, further discussed in Subpart E, below, under 
which the offender’s desert—that is, his degree of culpability and moral 
blameworthiness—does not impose strong requirements of minimum sanction 
severity. The start-at-zero presumption is also consistent with the way in which 
community-based sanctions have been incorporated into most guidelines 
systems: such systems either set no proportionality limits on probation conditions 
or only set upper, maximum-severity limits. As a practical matter, minimum-
severity requirements for community-based sentences would be enforced 
sporadically at best, especially in local jurisdictions with limited resources for 
such sanctions. Minimum-severity requirements would also greatly complicate 
sentencing rules and procedures. Admittedly, the start-at-zero approach permits 
equally culpable offenders to receive different levels of sanction severity. But 
these differences are limited in degree and, under the rules set out below, will 
usually not involve disparate use of custodial sanctions. 
2. All cells of the guidelines grid that carry a presumptive non-prison sentence 
should specify not only the duration of the maximum custody term in prison or 
jail that can be imposed in case of revocation of release, but also two other limits: 
the maximum number of punishment units that can be imposed as a condition of 
probation without upward departure and the maximum number of allowable 
probation-condition jail or other full-time custody days that can be imposed 
without departure. Punishment units would be computed using a system of 
equivalency scales for each type of probation condition. This suggestion reflects 
 
 40.  Some may argue that there is also a risk that probation conditions will not be severe enough, 
resulting in disproportionate leniency relative to the offender’s crime and loss of public respect and 
support. This question is discussed in Subpart E. 
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a blend of state-guidelines approaches: some states—Kansas and Minnesota, for 
example—list only the suspended prison term or range of terms in cells with 
recommended probation sentences, whereas Oregon lists only the maximum 
punishment units41 and allowable jail days. 
3. The duration of probation terms should be limited, as lengthy terms 
contribute to higher prison populations: the longer an offender is under 
supervision, the greater the likelihood that he or she will eventually violate one 
or more conditions of release and be revoked to prison. U.S. jurisdictions differ 
considerably in the lengths of probation terms that they authorize and impose, as 
well as on issues such as whether and under what circumstances offenders can be 
discharged early and how often this actually occurs. In many systems, it appears 
that excessively long probation terms are often imposed.42 For example, in 
Minnesota the maximum probation term for most felonies is four years or the 
maximum authorized prison term for that offense, which could be twenty years 
or more, whichever is longer, and the average term imposed is about four years, 
although many offenders are discharged early.43 The revised Model Penal Code 
provides that felony probation should not extend for more than three years,44 
which seems like a sensible rule. The Code also authorizes early discharge at any 
time if the court finds that the purposes of sentencing no longer justify 
continuation of supervision.45 
4. Offenders should have the right to refuse probation and demand execution 
of the recommended suspended prison or jail term provided for their offense and 
prior record. The right to refuse probation exists in many jurisdictions46 and 
serves to reinforce upper limits on the severity of probation conditions. If those 
conditions are very onerous and the suspended prison term is not very long, many 
offenders will chose to refuse probation and go to prison to “get it over with,” 
thereby also avoiding the risk that they will not successfully complete probation 
and end up suffering both the onerous probation conditions and the prison term. 
In Minnesota, the proportionality of probation conditions is maintained by 
allowing offenders to demand execution of the recommended suspended prison 
term upon a showing that the proposed conditions of probation are more onerous 
than the prison term47—an assessment that courts make case by case, although it 
would be more consistent if based on the kinds of sanction equivalency scales 
suggested above. The right to refuse probation also has practical value because 
 
 41.  The Oregon punishment units scale assigns unit values to each day of jail, inpatient treatment, 
part-time incarceration, house arrest, and community service imposed as a condition of probation. 
 42.  See ROBINA INST. 2014, supra note 12. 
 43.  Minn. Stat. §609.135, Subdiv. 2(a) (2018); ROBINA INST. 2014, supra note 12. 
 44.  MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.03(5) (AM. LAW INST. 2017). 
 45.  Id. § 6.03(6) 
 46.  See Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Right of Convicted Defendant to Refuse Probation, 28 A.L.R. 4th 
736 (2010). 
 47.  See State v. Rasinski, 472 N.W.2d 645, 650–51 (Minn. 1991). However, an offender may not 
demand execution of sentence if he would serve less than nine months in prison. MINN. STAT. § 609.135, 
Subdiv. 7 (2018). 
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offenders who strongly object to their required conditions make poor candidates 
for probation and can informally refuse probation by failing to comply with 
conditions thereby provoking revocation. 
5. Sentencing guidelines should strongly discourage reflexive revocation to 
prison or jail and excessive backup sanctions. Guidelines should (1) encourage a 
graduated response and more restrictive intermediate sanctions in lieu of prison 
or jail; (2) specify the kinds of new offenses and violations of release conditions 
that presumptively do or do not merit custodial sanctions; (3) specify normal 
upper limits on the severity of custodial sanctions for commonly occurring types 
of violation of probation conditions; and (4) reduce fiscal pressures to overuse 
direct-prison sentences and revocations to prison by providing state subsidies to 
fund effective community-based options, with charge-backs against those 
subsidies when low-level offenders are sent to prison. Each of these methods has 
been employed in one or more guidelines systems.48 
6. In case of revocation of release, offenders should be given credit for jail 
and other onerous conditions of probation that they have already completed, 
using equivalency scales for various types of conditions, as suggested above. In 
addition to preventing aggregate sanctions that are disproportionately severe 
relative to the offender’s conviction offense and prior record, such credit should 
reduce enforcement and prison-revocation costs. It may also discourage judges 
from imposing unnecessary release conditions—each additional unneeded 
condition imposed and completed would reduce the magnitude of revocation 
sanctions still available to the judge to enforce the remaining conditions, thereby 
reducing offender compliance incentives at that point. 
E. Are Probation Conditions Sometimes Too Lenient? When? 
The previous subpart argued that probation conditions are often too severe, 
thereby increasing rates of non-compliance and revocation to prison. 
Accordingly, judges should impose no conditions, other than to obey the law, 
unless the judge finds that one or more conditions are necessary and likely to 
achieve applicable sentencing purposes to a sufficient extent to justify their costs. 
This approach is easily defended on utilitarian (crime control) grounds: 
unnecessary probation conditions waste limited public resources that might help 
to prevent crime if otherwise deployed. Although utilitarian theory provides 
support for penalties that are proportionate to crime seriousness and consistently 
applied,49 any increase in deterrence benefits from greater sentence 
proportionality and consistency in the application of probation conditions is 
likely to be outweighed by losses in flexibility and efficiency when seeking to 
match probation conditions with individual offender risks and needs. 
But what about retributive punishment goals? If each offender should be 
punished in proportion to his or her blameworthiness, how can we justify major 
 
 48.  For further discussion, see FRASE, JUST SENTENCING, supra note 10, at ch. 3. 
 49.  For further discussion of utilitarian proportionality principles, see id. at ch. 2. 
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differences in punishment severity between offenders who receive and complete 
probation, compared to offenders committing a similar offense who are not 
deemed suitable probation candidates due to higher risk or previous failures on 
probation, and are therefore sentenced directly to prison? This question does not 
assume that a probation sentence with minimal conditions lacks punitive bite. 
The burden of living under constant threat of probation revocation is, by itself, a 
significant punishment, albeit still less severe than incarceration. 
In theory, it would be possible to add onerous probation conditions, greatly 
increase the duration of probation, or both so that the aggregate burdens of the 
probation sentence are roughly comparable to those of a prison term that is 
deemed proportionate to the offender’s crimes. But such enhanced probation 
sentences would be much costlier to administer, both directly, in terms of 
supervision costs, and indirectly, through higher revocation rates. And in 
practice, such a system would often be a sham, with no ability—and perhaps even 
without serious efforts—to enforce all of the conditions. Perhaps for these 
reasons, no U.S. guidelines system has attempted to require fully offense-
proportionate probation conditions; there are virtually no minimum 
requirements for the severity of probation conditions. 
This “proportionality gap”—between the severity of probation conditions 
and of the prison alternative imposed on similar offenders who are denied 
probation at sentencing or are later sent to prison after revocation—poses a 
serious challenge for any strict retributive theory that specifies a single deserved 
penalty or narrow range of penalties for a given case. The different degrees of 
sentence severity typically given to probationers and those sent to prison are 
much easier to accommodate under a negative, limiting-retributive (desert-
range) theory, that is, a theory under which the offender’s degree of culpability 
and moral blameworthiness only sets outer limits on punishment severity. 
There are two main varieties of negative or limiting retributivism.50 The 
first—what some have called the “imprecise-desert” theory—is based on the view 
that judgments about desert, even relative or “ordinal” desert,51 can only be made 
in very rough terms that define a range of “not-undeserved” penalties. The 
second limiting retributive theory is more precise, but asymmetric. It assumes 
that judgments about relative desert can be made with a reasonable degree of 
precision, or at least as much precision as any other legal finding that is commonly 
made by courts. But the asymmetric-desert theory further posits that it is 
especially important to avoid punishing an offender more severely than he 
deserves because such a result is a much greater injustice than punishing the 
offender less than he deserves. An analogous asymmetric value judgment 
underlies criminal procedure requirements of jury unanimity and proof beyond 
reasonable doubt, as well as criminal law doctrines such as the rule of lenity 
whereby ambiguous criminal statutes are construed in the defendant’s favor. 
 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  A comparison of one crime, or offender, to another crime or offender. 
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Many have argued that it is both necessary and just to give some offenders less 
than they deserve, at least initially, to conserve resources and avoid making some 
offenders more crime-prone. 
All of this is more than just academic theory. In most respects the Minnesota 
sentencing guidelines have implemented an asymmetric limiting retributive 
model, and to a lesser extent, so have other guidelines systems. No modern 
sentencing system, with or without guidelines, seems have adopted either a strict 
retributive sentencing model or an imprecise-desert limiting retributive model. 
Nor has any system adopted a pure crime-control model; all systems place 
offense-based maximum-severity limits on punishment that may not be exceeded 
even if it can be shown that greater severity would be cost-effective from a crime-
control perspective.52 
Nevertheless, even under a limiting retributive model, most probation 
sentences require some minimum degree of sanction severity, either to promote 
fairness to other offenders similarly situated except as to amenability to 
probation—a deontological argument—or to avoid depreciating the seriousness 
of the probationer’s offense and undermining public respect and support for the 
sentence—a utilitarian or “expressive” rationale.53 
F. The Effects on Prison Rates of Different Ways of Structuring Probation and 
Backup Sanctions 
In the previous discussion, some of the suggested advantages and 
disadvantages of different ways of structuring probation and backup sanctions 
were based on assumptions about the likely effects of different structures on 
revocation rates and prison populations. Can these effects be measured with data 
on sentencing, revocation, and prison populations in systems that use different 
options? Unfortunately, at present the answer is no. Most guidelines commissions 
maintain and analyze substantial amounts of data on sentences imposed, but to 
my knowledge no commission publishes data on probation revocations, broken 
down by backup sanction type if more than one type is used in that jurisdiction. 
It is unknown how many commissions even collect such data. Prison population 
data, however, is available for each state, and some rough patterns emerge: Table 
5 shows the average per capita prison rates in 2016, the most recent year with 
data, for the states in the five groups of systems shown in Table 2. 
 
 
 52.  For further discussion of varying retributive accounts, and the ways in which they have been 
implemented under U.S. guidelines and other sentencing regimes, see FRASE, JUST SENTENCING, supra 
note 10, at ch. 2–3. 
 53.  For further discussion of the potential loss of perceived legitimacy and public confidence in 
probation sentences that lack substantial punitive bite, see Keir Irwin-Rogers & Julian V. Roberts, 
Swimming against the Tide: The Suspended Sentence Order in England and Wales, 2004–2017, 82 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. no. 1, 2019 at 144 and Cheryl Marie Webster & Anthony N. Doob, Missed 
Opportunities: Canada’s Experience with the Conditional Sentence, 82 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. no. 1, 
2019 at 163. 
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Table 5: Per Capita Prison Rates in 2016 for U.S. Sentencing Guidelines States 
By Type of Available Custodial Backup Sanctions [CBS] For Violations of 
Probation Conditions*54 
As predicted, the two groups of states—groups 4 and 5 in this table—that use 
or encourage the use of non-prison custodial backup sanctions have lower 
average prison rates (363 and 400 inmates per 100,000 state residents) than the 
three groups of states that use only SEPS, SIS, or both for backup sanctions. But 
there are major variations within groups 4 and 5: North Carolina’s rate is 50 
percent higher than Utah’s, and Oregon’s rate is 40 percent higher than 
Washington’s. Indeed, the North Carolina and Oregon prison rates are both 
actually higher than the average rate for group 3 (428 per 100,000), comprised of 
states that do not require or encourage non-prison backup sanctions. Moreover, 
in several of these states there are other known factors that also strongly 
determine the state’s prison rate. In Oregon, mandatory-minimum prison 
sentences often apply; in Utah, crime rates are relatively low so we would expect 
that state’s prison rate to also be low. In short, although it is plausible to suppose 
that prison rates are affected by different ways of structuring probation and 
backup sanctions for non-compliance, much more research is needed to specify 
the relative contribution of these and other determinants of state incarceration 
rates. 
Another way to assess the impacts that different methods of structuring non-
prison sanctions have on prison populations would be to examine prison rates 
before and after a major change in such structures. But Washington State is the 
only guidelines jurisdiction to have made such a change in recent decades—SEPS 
and SIS were largely abandoned when the guidelines went into effect. And again, 
the evidence is equivocal. Although the percentage of felons receiving an 
immediate prison sentence fell slightly in the first few years of guidelines 
 
   54. Prisoners in 2016, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS (2018), https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty= 
pbdetail&iid=6187 [https://perma.cc/VG9M-U8DE]. 
51 - FRASE - SUSPENDED SENTENCES US (DO NOT DELETE) 2/14/2019  2:27 PM 
No. 1 2019] SURVEY AND ASSESSMENT 79 
sentencing in Washington, those rates then went back up and stabilized at rates 
almost double what they had been before the guidelines.55 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
This article has examined three types of custodial backup sanctions, to 
enforce conditions of probation, that are used in U.S. state and federal 
jurisdictions with sentencing guidelines. Each type has advantages and 
disadvantages with respect to important sentencing policy and sentencing reform 
goals, especially controlling prison population growth and avoiding net-widening; 
assuring adequate incentives for offender compliance with release conditions; 
allowing courts to increase sanction severity in response to heightened and 
unforeseen offender risk; providing an expressive statement about the relative 
seriousness of the offender’s crime and not depreciating its seriousness; 
maintaining proportionality between executed custodial backup sanctions and 
the seriousness of the offender’s crime; and mitigating the damaging collateral 
consequences to offenders of having a record of felony conviction or a record of 
imprisonment. Many of the disadvantages of each type of custodial backup 
sanction can be mitigated by appropriate statutory and guidelines rules for 
judges. This article has suggested additional safeguards that should be 
implemented, regardless of the type of backup sanctions employed. 
 
 
 
 55.  See FRASE, JUST SENTENCING, supra note 10, at 145. 
